the security, secrecy, and transparency requirements for online voting transactions are structurally very different from, and generally much stricter than, those for E-Commerce transactions. The security mechanisms that make ecommerce transactions relatively safe for (consumers at least) are not sufficient to guarantee the safety of online voting.
The first major distinction is that we can at least eventually detect E-Commerce errors and fraud, but we may never even know about online election fraud.
2019/04/01: Currently, I believe that online voting is not ready for any high-stakes elections (such as national elections). On the other hand, there are many elections that are not high stakes. Last December in France, for example, we had all our professional elections, where we voted for union representatives and so on. The stakes for that sort of election are not especially high, in the sense that there is not a high risk of coercion, so e-voting could be a viable alternative.
2019/02/10: Libertà di voto. Ciascun elettore è libero di votare senza condizionamenti e pressioni esterne. Tale principio viene rispettato più facilmente quando la procedura è soggetta a controlli, come avviene nei seggi elettorali. Ciò non può dirsi nel caso del voto online, quando la scelta si effettua con un click, seduti comodamente a casa. L'Estonia, tuttavia, consente ai suoi elettori di votare online più volte, fino al giorno ufficiale delle elezioni. Solo l'ultimo voto viene però considerato e va ad annullare quelli precedenti, eventualmente estorti con violenza. L'elettore ha quindi la possibilità di correggere il suo voto qualora non corrisponda alla propria volontà. Inoltre, il voto nei seggi elettorali viene preferito a quello online.
2017/06/01: Internet voting (i-voting) is often discussed as a potential remedy against declining turnout rates. This paper presents new evidence on the causal effect of i-voting on turnout, drawing on trials conducted in two Swiss cantons: Geneva and Zurich. Both Geneva and Zurich constitute hard cases for i-voting, given that i-voting was introduced in the presence of postal voting. However, this setting allows us to test some of the more optimistic claims regarding i-voting's ability to increase turnout. Empirically, we exploit the advantageous circumstance that federal legislation created a situation coming close to a natural experiment, with some of Geneva's and Zurich's municipalities participating in i-voting trials and others not. Using difference-in-differences estimation, we find that i-voting did not increase turnout in the cantons of Geneva and Zurich.
2016/06/03: Ultimately, is paper the gold standard we should stick to?
Yes. Paper has some fundamental properties as a technology that make it the right thing to use for voting. You have more-or-less indelible marks on the thing. You have physical objects you can control. And everyone understands it. If you’re in a polling place and somebody disappears with a ballot box into a locked room and emerges with a smirk, maybe you know that there is a problem. We’ve had a long time to work out the procedures with paper ballots and need to think twice before we try to throw a new technology at the problem. People take paper ballots for granted and don’t understand how carefully thought through they are.
2009/04/11: on the Finnish municipal election in which 2% of the votes were lost by a defective e-voting system, and which the Helsinki Administrative Court had found acceptable. Now the Supreme Administrative Court of Finland has rejected the election results and ordered the election to be re-run. Apparently 98% of the votes isn't enough to determine how the remaining 2% voted, after all.
E-voting is sold to the public as a solution to the problem of democratic participation, especially 'the youth' turnout. Recent experience suggest that isn't the case. In fact, e-voting creates problems, not solutions, and these problems are unsolvable.
The Estonian i-voting system has settled a new record. During the last
They are old, buggy, and insecure. If someone wanted to mess with the US election, these machines would be an easy way in.
It's not safe to connect our voting infrastructure to the Internet, but some election boards are doing it anyway.
Helios is truly verifiable. Each voter obtains a smart ballot tracker which can be checked against the Ballot Tracking Center to ensure that the ballot was received and tallied appropriately. What this means is that no one, not even the administrators of the Helios Voting system, can alter your vote.
Recent studies show how the building where you vote - whether it's a church or a school - can subconsciously influence which boxes you check on the ballot
Online voting could boost turnout, but a flawed system could destroy faith in the voting process.
Le critiche si abbattono sul sistema di i-voting: il team che si occupa della sua sicurezza sarebbe inaffidabile e diverse sarebbero le vulnerabilità sfruttabili, anche con attacchi concertati a livello statale
Last week's election raised a lot of questions, including "should Nick Clegg resign?", "should people calling for Nick Clegg to resign shut up?" and "why didn't you vote for me? Is it because I smell?" (that last one mostly being asked by me, to be fair). But one topic I've seen coming up over and