mfioretti: india* + aadhaar*

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  1. The students are not complaining on the methodology of their teaching but on the way the coaching institute is extracting money from the students and their parents.

    The main culprit behind the whole ‘fraud’ that students claim is the Aadhaar’s Instant Authentication System. The system is being used to extract money from a student or parent’s bank account even before ‘they have agreed to be enrolled in the course or negotiated on the fee’.

    Here is how it works. The student walks into the coaching institute. The institute asks them to bring their Aadhaar card for registration and a finger print authentication on an app. The coaching institute also asks for a signature on a sheet where its written ECS Mandate.

    The students are apparently told that they would be given a loan only if they agree to being enrolled after attending a few ‘demo classes’.

    But lo an behold! Within 24 hours, the students are sent a loan agreement letter on their email id by an NBFC.

    The agreement says that they have taken a loan and upon their request, the amount has been paid to the institute. After a class or two, when the students find they are not interested in the course, the NBFC says that the money for the entire year has already been transferred to the institute’s bank account.

    And the institute is unwilling to refund the money.

    From the next month onwards, the EMI starts getting debited from a student or their parent’s bank account even though the student is not enrolled in the institute or attending its classes.
    https://www.moneycontrol.com/news/bus...13.html/amp?__twitter_impression=true
    Tags: , by M. Fioretti (2018-03-03)
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  2. Whenever a BPL (below poverty line) ration card-holder like Ali goes to the PDS outlet, the shopkeeper asks for the family’s ration card number and punches it into a small machine. The device then displays the list of family members and the person present has to authenticate this with his or her fingerprints. The dealer gives the rations according to the number of persons the machine shows. But Ali's name had disappeared from the online list of names in his family’s ration card. "I went many times and my name was not there,” he says. “When they punch in our number, five names should show up. But only four do, mine is missing. Only if the name is there, the fingerprints work. Otherwise they don't work."
    https://ruralindiaonline.org/articles...e-ration-cards-or-faulty-aadhaar-data
    Tags: , , , by M. Fioretti (2018-03-02)
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  3. After the first communication to the PMO, which set the ball rolling, he was informed that the system had rejected his enrolment since his fingerprints partially matched with not one, but seven registered citizens, all from Surpur taluk in Yadgir district.

    “I tracked them and presented them physically before the officials,” he said, to establish that there was no duplication. His number was finally generated at the Aadhaar Adalat at Yadgir recently. Of the seven with whom his fingerprints had partially matched included a child and an 86-year-old. “How could my fingerprints match with seven persons, and yet they got Aadhaar?” he asked.

    UIDAI sources say the problem began for Mr. Gurikar after he, in the past, tried to help those who came to the enrolment centres. “While helping people get their biometrics right, even his fingerprints had been partially captured in seven cases. Though Aadhaar had been generated for the seven, their numbers had been deactivated by the system automatically.” Sources said the fingerprints of the seven were recaptured and their Aadhaar numbers enabled. This helped Mr. Gurikar get Aadhaar.
    http://www.thehindu.com/news/national...atch-seven-others/article22466491.ece
    Tags: , , , by M. Fioretti (2018-01-19)
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  4. A centralised database, dual use as identifier and authenticator, and lack of sound legal framework are its main weaknesses.
    https://scroll.in/article/833230/expl...-of-its-design-and-the-way-it-is-used
    Tags: , , , by M. Fioretti (2018-01-09)
    Voting 0
  5. The UIDAI goes on about how biometrics are safe and out of reach. The truth is, biometrics are collapsing all round. The figures for biometric failure have been staggering. In Rajasthan, in the PDS, exclusion because of fingerprint failure has been close to 36 per cent — which means not even one person from 36 per cent households are able to authenticate using their fingerprints. Jharkhand has witnessed deaths because the poorest have had difficulty linking their UID number with their ration card. Documents in the UIDAI archive from between 2009 and 2012 show that biometrics was still in an experimental phase. That biometrics are not working as hoped is made evident in the Watal Committee report on digital transactions, in December 2016. At pp. 123-124, the committee says that biometric authentication requires the availability of internet and high-quality machines capable of capturing biometric details, making it contingent on these working. So, the committee asks that for digital transactions, the “OTP sent on registered mobile number of Aadhaar holder” be allowed, thereby downgrading biometrics.

    Digital payments are in the business interest; not PDS. So, while fingerprints cause huge problems to the poor, the business interest shifts to other means because biometrics are not dependable.

    The mantra has, in fact, been JAM — Jan Dhan, Aadhaar, mobile — three numbers that make up identity. It was in 2010 that Nandan Nilekani said to a reporter: “The slogan of “bijli, sadak, paani” is passé; ‘virtual things’ like UID number, bank account and mobile phone are the in-thing.” That is the imagination that is driving the project today. It is these three numbers that are being exposed in the breaches. Then, to say that all is well is clearly not quite the truth.

    The project is putting people, and the nation, at risk. Those in court challenging the project have been demanding that the project be scrapped — not just the UIDAI, but the project. The breaches explain why what they are asking makes sense.
    http://indianexpress.com/article/opin...-aadhaar-leak-aadhaar-details-5013305
    Tags: , , , by M. Fioretti (2018-01-07)
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  6. should Central and State governments, banks and insurance companies, mobile phone operators, educational institutions, airlines and hospitals be vested with the draconian power to take coercive action against any person who does not have Aadhaar verification and to deprive him or her of basic services and benefits?

    This is the far-reaching, game-changing, mind-wrenching judgment that Justices Dipak Misra, Sikri, Khanwilkar, Chandrachud and Ashok Bhushan will have to deliver. It is an onerous task; and an awesome responsibility. It will alter the equation between citizenship and society, governance and commerce for generations to come.

    And, moreover, it is irreversible. Once Aadhaar is made mandatory, it will be meaningless to declare it to be voluntary or optional through some future judicial review.
    https://www.nationalheraldindia.com/o...-aadhaar-intrusion-would-be-illogical
    Tags: , , , by M. Fioretti (2017-12-17)
    Voting 0
  7. Unlike the Passport Officer, the RTO, the Electoral Officer, the CEO of UIDAI does not take any legal liability to certify the number as a proof of anyone’s identity, address or existence. Furthermore no one has verified or audited the database to establish how many of the billion numbers that are linked to data submitted by the outsourced parties are real individuals.

    The resulting Aadhaar database is the database being used to “purify”, as described by Ajay Bhushan Pandey the CEO of UIDAI, all databases that are seeded with Aadhaar. The seeding of other databases with the Aadhaar number is also unlike any other identification document. This seeding threatens to exclude the genuine and include the fake into other existing databases by seeding Aadhaar to other databases. The case of over 13,000 fake employees in Satyam’s who got salaries every month for years before being exposed is still fresh in India.

    As the government embarks to link the entire Consolidated Fund of India’s receipts and expenditure to this database, is it not reasonable to establish some CAG certificate on the existence of every person in this database?

    Mr. Nilekani has often highlighted the use of biometric to authenticate who you are as the core strength of the Aadhaar database. What he fails to state is that even if biometric could uniquely establish your identity uniquely throughout your life, which it cannot, its use for authentication is absurd.

    Once stolen, your biometric can be used, in a multiple of ways differing in simplicity and ease, by the thief, to perpetuate crimes that will be attributed to you and may be difficult, if not impossible, for you to deny.

    It is precisely this difference between the enrolment and use models of the Aadhaar in comparison with any other ID are a threat to you as well as the nation.
    https://tech.economictimes.indiatimes...ts/how-does-aadhaar-threaten-you/2277
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  8. the technology is colliding with the rickety reality of India, where many people live off the grid or have fingerprints compromised by manual labor or age.

    Panna Singh, a 55-year-old day laborer in the northwestern state of Rajasthan who breaks stones used to build walls, says the machine recognized his scuffed-up fingerprints only a couple of times.

    “I’ve come twice today,” he said at a ration shop in the village of Devdungri. “That’s a full day of work, gone.”

    Iris scans are meant to resolve situations where fingerprints don’t work, but shops don’t yet have iris scanners.
    https://www.wsj.com/articles/snags-mu...ut-1484237128?mod=rss_asia_whats_news
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  9. In this article, we ask if the legal foundations on which the Aadhaar operates match up to the requirements of a program that is likely to touch the lives of all citizens of India. Can we, as citizens of India, be satisfied that there are enough checks and balances in the functioning of Aadhaar?

    This is important as we have already started seeing implementation problems in the form of failure of bio-metric authentication, server and connectivity problems, cryptic error messages, and the irrevocability of the bio-metric, all of which have left the Aadhaar number holder and intended recipient of a subsidy without any remedy. As well, in the absence of an over-arching privacy law, our regulatory surveillance architecture is heavily weighted in favour of the State leading to the very real possibility of strengthening mass surveillance with little regard for the effect on individuals' rights to privacy.
    https://swarajyamag.com/ideas/is-the-...ource=twitter.com&utm_campaign=buffer
    Tags: , , , , by M. Fioretti (2017-03-27)
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  10. In Ghagaon, where a women’s cooperative runs the fair price shop, the internet has not worked even once. “We have to stand on the wall, or go near the pond, and ask everyone to come there to look for signal on the point of sale device,” said Mongra Sidar, a Gond Adivasi. “Or, we try inside the ration shop, then one person has to climb the chabootra elevated platform » , while another person stands on the ground to note down the details in the notebook.”

    In Raipur, officials said one lakh out of three lakh transactions using fingerprint authentication did not go through – a failure rate as high as 30%. They attributed the failures primarily to network connectivity problems and skin abrasions on fingers.
    Photographs as backup

    With fingerprint authentication failing for even genuine card holders who have been verified by local authorities, Chhattisgarh has come with an innovation: ration shop owners have been asked to take photographs of such people before giving them food rations.

    This photograph is stored in the government’s server. “It will serve as deterrent to ration dealers that even if there is a complaint six months later, the government can check if grains were given to the right beneficiaries,”

    “Earlier, we sent one boy on the bicycle to lift the rations for three households,” lamented Tapaswani Yadav, a middle-aged woman. “Now, it is a waste of time for everyone. Many elderly persons cannot walk, it is difficult for a few to even sit astride a motorcycle.”

    She added: “The machine is so slow, sometimes people reach the ration shop in the morning and return when the day is over.”

    Five technologies need to work together for biometric authentication to be successful – the point of sale device, internet connectivity, biometrics, the National Informatics Centre server, and the Unique Identity Authority of India servers. Invariably, one of the five fails.

    Shyamlal Dansena, the ration dealer in Dilari panchayat in Raigarh, said fingerprint authentication failed for 20% of the ration card holders on an average. But in October, he had to give grains to all 386 ration card holders after taking their photographs since the Samsung tablet purchased by the panchayat for enabling the Aadhaar-based transactions had stopped functioning.

    Dansena was preparing to travel 20 kilometers to Raigarh to get the tablet repaired. “The food officer said we can give November month’s grains only after the software is loaded again,” he said.
    http://scroll.in/article/822764/chhat...ar-when-fingerprints-fail-take-photos
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